Files
tkmind_go/crates/goose/src/security/patterns.rs
T

518 lines
19 KiB
Rust

use regex::Regex;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::LazyLock;
/// Security threat patterns for command injection detection
/// These patterns detect dangerous shell commands and injection attempts
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ThreatPattern {
pub name: &'static str,
pub pattern: &'static str,
pub description: &'static str,
pub risk_level: RiskLevel,
pub category: ThreatCategory,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum RiskLevel {
Low, // Minor security issue
Medium, // Moderate security concern
High, // Significant security risk
Critical, // Immediate system compromise risk
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum ThreatCategory {
FileSystemDestruction,
RemoteCodeExecution,
DataExfiltration,
SystemModification,
NetworkAccess,
ProcessManipulation,
PrivilegeEscalation,
CommandInjection,
}
impl RiskLevel {
pub fn confidence_score(&self) -> f32 {
match self {
RiskLevel::Critical => 0.95,
RiskLevel::High => 0.75,
RiskLevel::Medium => 0.60,
RiskLevel::Low => 0.45,
}
}
}
/// Comprehensive list of dangerous command patterns
pub const THREAT_PATTERNS: &[ThreatPattern] = &[
ThreatPattern {
name: "rm_rf_root_bare",
pattern: r"rm\s+(-[rRfF]+\s+)*(-[rRfF]+|--recursive|--force|--no-preserve-root)(\s+(-[rRfF]+|--recursive|--force|--no-preserve-root))*\s+['\x22]?/(\*)?['\x22]?(\s|[;&|]|$)",
description: "Recursive deletion of root filesystem",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::FileSystemDestruction,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "rm_rf_home_or_root",
pattern: r"rm\s+((--[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\-]*|--|-[a-zA-Z]+)\s+)*(-[a-zA-Z]*[rR][a-zA-Z]*|--recursive|--dir|-d)(\s+(--[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\-]*|--|-[a-zA-Z]+))*\s+['\x22]?(~|\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|/home|/root)/?(\*)?['\x22]?(\s|[;&|]|$)",
description: "Recursive deletion of home or root directory",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::FileSystemDestruction,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "dd_destruction",
pattern: r"dd\s+.*if=/dev/(zero|random|urandom).*of=/dev/[sh]d[a-z]",
description: "Disk destruction using dd command",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::FileSystemDestruction,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "format_drive",
pattern: r"(format|mkfs\.[a-z]+)\s+[/\\]dev[/\\][sh]d[a-z]",
description: "Formatting system drives",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::FileSystemDestruction,
},
// Remote code execution patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "curl_bash_execution",
pattern: r"(curl|wget)\s+.*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh|fish|csh|tcsh)",
description: "Remote script execution via curl/wget piped to shell",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::RemoteCodeExecution,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "bash_process_substitution",
pattern: r"bash\s*<\s*\(\s*(curl|wget)",
description: "Bash process substitution with remote content",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::RemoteCodeExecution,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "python_remote_exec",
pattern: r"python[23]?\s+-c\s+.*urllib|requests.*exec",
description: "Python remote code execution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::RemoteCodeExecution,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "powershell_download_exec",
pattern: r"powershell.*DownloadString.*Invoke-Expression",
description: "PowerShell remote script execution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::RemoteCodeExecution,
},
// Data exfiltration patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "ssh_key_exfiltration",
pattern: r"(curl|wget).*-d.*\.ssh/(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa)",
description: "SSH key exfiltration",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::DataExfiltration,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "password_file_access",
pattern: r"(cat|grep|awk|sed).*(/etc/shadow|\.password)",
description: "Password/shadow file access",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::DataExfiltration,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "history_exfiltration",
pattern: r"(curl|wget).*-d.*\.(bash_history|zsh_history|history)",
description: "Command history exfiltration",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::DataExfiltration,
},
// System modification patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "crontab_modification",
pattern: r"(crontab\s+-e|echo.*>.*crontab|.*>\s*/var/spool/cron)",
description: "Crontab modification for persistence",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "systemd_service_creation",
pattern: r"systemctl.*enable|.*\.service.*>/etc/systemd",
description: "Systemd service creation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "hosts_file_modification",
pattern: r"echo.*>(>?)\s*(/etc/hosts|hosts\.txt)|echo.*\|\s*(sudo\s+)?tee\s+(-a\s+)?/etc/hosts",
description: "Hosts file modification",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
// Network access patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "netcat_listener",
pattern: r"nc\s+(-l|-p)\s+\d+",
description: "Netcat listener creation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::NetworkAccess,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "reverse_shell",
pattern: r"(nc|netcat|bash|sh).*-e\s*(bash|sh|/bin/bash|/bin/sh)",
description: "Reverse shell creation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::NetworkAccess,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "ssh_tunnel",
pattern: r"ssh\s+.*-[LRD]\s+\d+:",
description: "SSH tunnel creation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::NetworkAccess,
},
// Process manipulation patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "kill_security_process",
pattern: r"kill(all)?\s+.*\b(antivirus|firewall|defender|security|monitor)\b",
description: "Killing security processes",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::ProcessManipulation,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "process_injection",
pattern: r"gdb\s+.*attach|ptrace.*PTRACE_POKETEXT",
description: "Process injection techniques",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::ProcessManipulation,
},
// Privilege escalation patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "sudo_without_password",
pattern: r"echo.*NOPASSWD.*>.*sudoers",
description: "Sudo privilege escalation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::PrivilegeEscalation,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "suid_binary_creation",
pattern: r"chmod\s+[47][0-7][0-7][0-7]|chmod\s+\+s",
description: "SUID binary creation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::PrivilegeEscalation,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "encoded_commands",
pattern: r"(base64|hex|url).*decode.*\|\s*(bash|sh)",
description: "Encoded command execution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
// Obfuscation and evasion patterns
ThreatPattern {
name: "base64_encoded_shell",
pattern: r"(echo|printf)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}\s*\|\s*base64\s+-d\s*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh)",
description: "Base64 encoded shell commands",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "hex_encoded_commands",
pattern: r"(echo|printf)\s+[0-9a-fA-F\\x]{20,}\s*\|\s*(xxd|od).*\|\s*(bash|sh)",
description: "Hex encoded command execution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "eval_with_variables",
pattern: r"eval\s+\$[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*|\beval\s+.*\$\{",
description: "Eval with variable substitution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "indirect_command_execution",
pattern: r"\$\([^)]*\$\([^)]*\)[^)]*\)|`[^`]*`[^`]*`",
description: "Nested command substitution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "unicode_obfuscation",
pattern: r"\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}|\\U[0-9a-fA-F]{8}",
description: "Unicode character obfuscation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::CommandInjection,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "docker_privileged_exec",
pattern: r"docker\s+(run|exec).*--privileged",
description: "Docker privileged container execution",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::PrivilegeEscalation,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "container_escape",
pattern: r"(chroot|unshare|nsenter).*--mount|--pid|--net",
description: "Container escape techniques",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::PrivilegeEscalation,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "kernel_module_manipulation",
pattern: r"(insmod|rmmod|modprobe).*\.ko",
description: "Kernel module manipulation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Critical,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "memory_dump",
pattern: r"(gcore|gdb.*dump|/proc/[0-9]+/mem)",
description: "Memory dumping techniques",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::DataExfiltration,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "log_manipulation",
pattern: r"(truncate.*log|rm\s+((--[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\-]*|--|-[a-zA-Z]+)\s+)*/var/log(/|\s|[;&|]|$)|echo\s*>\s*/var/log)",
description: "Log file manipulation or deletion",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "file_timestamp_manipulation",
pattern: r"touch\s+-[amt]\s+|utimes|futimes",
description: "File timestamp manipulation",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Low,
category: ThreatCategory::SystemModification,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "steganography_tools",
pattern: r"\b(steghide|outguess|jphide|steganos)\b",
description: "Steganography tools usage",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::DataExfiltration,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "network_scanning",
pattern: r"\b(nmap|masscan|zmap|unicornscan)\b.*-[sS]",
description: "Network scanning tools",
risk_level: RiskLevel::Medium,
category: ThreatCategory::NetworkAccess,
},
ThreatPattern {
name: "password_cracking_tools",
pattern: r"\bjohn\s+--[a-z]|\b(hashcat|hydra|medusa|brutespray)\b",
description: "Password cracking tools",
risk_level: RiskLevel::High,
category: ThreatCategory::PrivilegeEscalation,
},
];
static COMPILED_PATTERNS: LazyLock<HashMap<&'static str, Regex>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
let mut patterns = HashMap::new();
for threat in THREAT_PATTERNS {
if let Ok(regex) = Regex::new(&format!("(?i){}", threat.pattern)) {
patterns.insert(threat.name, regex);
}
}
patterns
});
/// Pattern matcher for detecting security threats
pub struct PatternMatcher {
patterns: &'static HashMap<&'static str, Regex>,
}
impl PatternMatcher {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
patterns: &COMPILED_PATTERNS,
}
}
pub fn scan_for_patterns(&self, text: &str) -> Vec<PatternMatch> {
let mut matches = Vec::new();
for threat in THREAT_PATTERNS {
if let Some(regex) = self.patterns.get(threat.name) {
if regex.is_match(text) {
// Find all matches to get position information
for regex_match in regex.find_iter(text) {
matches.push(PatternMatch {
threat: threat.clone(),
matched_text: regex_match.as_str().to_string(),
start_pos: regex_match.start(),
end_pos: regex_match.end(),
});
}
}
}
}
// Sort by risk level (highest first), then by position in text
matches.sort_by_key(|m| (std::cmp::Reverse(m.threat.risk_level.clone()), m.start_pos));
matches
}
/// Get the highest risk level from matches
pub fn get_max_risk_level(&self, matches: &[PatternMatch]) -> Option<RiskLevel> {
matches.iter().map(|m| &m.threat.risk_level).max().cloned()
}
/// Check if any critical or high-risk patterns are detected
pub fn has_critical_threats(&self, matches: &[PatternMatch]) -> bool {
matches
.iter()
.any(|m| matches!(m.threat.risk_level, RiskLevel::Critical | RiskLevel::High))
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PatternMatch {
pub threat: ThreatPattern,
pub matched_text: String,
pub start_pos: usize,
pub end_pos: usize,
}
impl Default for PatternMatcher {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn matches(pattern_name: &str, input: &str) -> bool {
let matcher = PatternMatcher::new();
matcher
.scan_for_patterns(input)
.iter()
.any(|m| m.threat.name == pattern_name)
}
#[test]
fn rm_rf_root_bare_matches_known_variants() {
let pat = "rm_rf_root_bare";
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /*"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /; whoami"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /&&echo ok"));
}
#[test]
fn rm_rf_root_bare_no_false_positives() {
let pat = "rm_rf_root_bare";
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ./build"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /tmp/cache"));
}
#[test]
fn rm_rf_home_or_root_matches_bare_targets() {
let pat = "rm_rf_home_or_root";
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ~"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ~/"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf $HOME"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf $HOME/"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ${HOME}"));
assert!(matches(pat, r#"rm -rf "${HOME}""#));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /home"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /home/"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /root"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /root/"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -fr ~"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm --recursive --force ~"));
assert!(matches(pat, r#"rm -rf "$HOME""#));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ~; echo done"));
// Wildcard wipes of contents
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /home/*"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /root/*"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ~/*"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf ${HOME}/*"));
assert!(matches(pat, r#"rm -rf "/home/*""#));
// Extra flags and option separator
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rfv ~"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf -- ~"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm --recursive --force -- /home/*"));
}
#[test]
fn rm_rf_home_or_root_no_false_positives_on_subdirs() {
let pat = "rm_rf_home_or_root";
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ~/Documents/my-gh-repo"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ~/.cache"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf $HOME/build"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ${HOME}/build"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ${HOMEDIR}"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /home/user"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /home/user/project"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /root/tmp"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ./home"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf $HOMEDIR"));
// Wildcards inside subdirs should not match
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /home/user/*"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf ~/Documents/*"));
// Flags that cannot recursively remove directories should not fire
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -i /root"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -f ~"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm --force ~"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm --help ~"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -v ~"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -- ~"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm ~"));
}
#[test]
fn password_cracking_tools_matches_real_invocations() {
let pat = "password_cracking_tools";
assert!(matches(
pat,
"john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt"
));
assert!(matches(pat, "/usr/sbin/john --format=raw-md5 hashes.txt"));
assert!(matches(pat, "john --rules --incremental hash.txt"));
assert!(matches(pat, "hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 hash.txt wordlist.txt"));
assert!(matches(pat, "hydra -l admin -P passwords.txt ssh://target"));
assert!(matches(
pat,
"medusa -h target -u admin -P wordlist.txt -M ssh"
));
}
#[test]
fn password_cracking_tools_no_false_positives_on_name_john() {
let pat = "password_cracking_tools";
assert!(!matches(pat, "# DS_PLATFORM -> John's integration type"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "git log --author=John"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "echo \"Hello John\""));
assert!(!matches(pat, "grep -r \"john.doe@company.com\" ."));
assert!(!matches(pat, "mkdir -p /home/john"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "cat /tmp/john_report.csv"));
}
#[test]
fn log_manipulation_no_dev_null_false_positives() {
let pat = "log_manipulation";
// Standard stderr suppression should NOT match
assert!(!matches(pat, "ls 2>/dev/null"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -f /tmp/file 2>/dev/null"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "command > /dev/null 2>&1"));
// Actual log tampering should still match
assert!(matches(pat, "truncate -s 0 /var/log/auth.log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "echo > /var/log/syslog"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -f /var/log/auth.log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /var/log/syslog"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -fr /var/log/auth.log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf /var/log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm --recursive --force /var/log/auth.log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm --recursive /var/log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rf -- /var/log/auth.log"));
assert!(matches(pat, "rm -rfv /var/log/auth.log"));
// Similar-looking paths outside /var/log should NOT match
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /var/log-backup"));
assert!(!matches(pat, "rm -rf /var/logs"));
}
}